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A 14-day limit for bioethics: the debate
over human embryo research
Giulia Cavaliere
Abstract
Background: This article explores the reasons in favour of revising and extending the current 14-day statutory limit
to maintaining human embryos in culture. This limit is enshrined in law in over a dozen countries, including the
United Kingdom. In two recently published studies (2016), scientists have shown that embryos can be sustained in
vitro for about 13 days after fertilisation. Positive reactions to these results have gone hand in hand with calls for
revising the 14-day rule, which only allows embryo research until the 14th day after fertilisation.
Main text: The article explores the most prominent arguments in favour of and against the extension of the 14-day
limit for conducting research on human embryos. It situates these arguments within the history of the 14-day limit.
I start by discussing the history of the 14-day limit in the United Kingdom and the reasons behind the decision to
opt for a compromise between competing moral views. I then analyse the arguments that those who are generally
in favour of embryo research put forward in support of extending the 14-day rule, namely (a) the argument of the
beneficence of research and (b) the argument of technical feasibility (further explained in the article). I then show
how these two arguments played a role in the recent approval of two novel techniques for the replacement of
faulty mitochondrial DNA in the United Kingdom. Despite the popularity and widespread use of these arguments, I
argue that they are ultimately problematic and should not be straightforwardly accepted (i.e. accepted without
further scrutiny). I end by making a case for respecting value pluralism in the context of embryo research, and I
present two reasons in favour of respecting value pluralism: the argument of public trust and the argument of
democracy.
Conclusion: I argue that 14-day limit for embryo research is not a valuable tool despite being a solution of compromise,
but rather because of it. The importance of respecting value pluralism (and of respecting different views on embryo
research) needs to be considered in any evaluation concerning a potential change to the 14-day rule.
Keywords: Embryo research, Value pluralism, Compromise, Beneficence, Warnock report
Background
In August 2016, in a letter in Nature and in an article pub-
lished in Nature Cell Biology, two groups based in differ-
ent research centres in the United Kingdom (Cambridge
and London) and in the United States (The Rockefeller
University, New York) presented the results of their exper-
iments on in vitro human embryos. For the first time, the
embryos were sustained in vitro for 12-13 days after fertil-
isation [1, 2]. Prior to this, scientists were only able to sus-
tain embryos in vitro for about seven days [3].
Many members of the scientific and bioethics communi-
ties reacted enthusiastically to these advances, due to the
novelty of the results and to the potential benefits that they
could bring about [3–5]. Research involving human em-
bryos allows us to increase our understanding of the first
stages of embryo development and it is considered instru-
mental to shedding light on the causes of early miscar-
riages, of problems related to infertility and of birth defects
[6]. In addition to this, embryo research has been instru-
mental to the development of human embryonic stem cells,
cells derived from embryos have proved to be clinically use-
ful to cure certain degenerative diseases [6–8]. Sustaining
embryos in vitro for a longer period of time could allow an
even greater understanding of the causes of embryo defects
and early miscarriages, and it could prove especially clinic-
ally beneficial for women who have experienced multiple
early pregnancy losses. Due to the current benefits of
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embryo research and to the potential future benefits of it,
the positive reactions to these experiments went hand in
hand with a call for revising and extending the so-called
14-day rule. This rule allows research involving human em-
bryos up until the 14th day after fertilisation, a statutory
binding limit in over a dozen countries [3, 9].
This article explores the arguments for and against ex-
tending the 14-day limit for research on human embryos.
In the following section, I briefly present the history of
how the 14-day rule came about in the United Kingdom
and the reasons behind the decision to opt for a solution
of compromise. In section 3, I discuss the arguments that
those who are generally in favour of embryo research put
forward in support of extending the 14-day rule, namely
the argument of the beneficence of research and the argu-
ment of technical feasibility (further explained below). I
show how these two arguments played a role in the
process that led to the approval of mitochondrial replace-
ment techniques in the United Kingdom. In section 4, I
discuss why I find these arguments wanting. In the last
section (5), I present two arguments in favour of com-
promise, namely the argument of trust and the argument
of respect for value pluralism. I conclude that the import-
ance of respecting value pluralism needs to be taken into
account in any evaluation concerning a potential change
of the 14-day rule.
The 14-day limit and the Warnock report
The publication of the aforementioned two articles in
Nature and Nature Cell Biology triggered a resurgence of
the debate on embryo research and on the 14-day limit to
carry out research on in-vitro human embryos. The 14-
day limit came about in the United Kingdom at the begin-
ning of the 1980s. Its birth is closely linked to another,
non-metaphorical, British birth: the first test-tube baby
(i.e. a baby conceived via in-vitro fertilisation), Louise
Brown, was born in the United Kingdom in 1978. As
noted by historian Duncan Wilson, after the initial excite-
ment surrounding Louise Brown’s birth, public attitudes
towards IVF shifted from an initially more favourable
stance to a more critical view of the practice [10–12].
These predominantly negative attitudes, and the necessity
to decide upon the fate of embryos ‘left over’ after IVF
procedures,1 contributed to calls for a tighter oversight of
the practice. They also underscored the importance of de-
ciding whether it was permissible to use these spare em-
bryos for research [10–12].
At that time, embryo research was the most debated
matter concerning the ethics of IVF [13–15]. Two con-
flicting positions dominated the public debate: on the one
hand, those of whom were outright against embryo re-
search. On the other, those of whom were in favour of
doing research on embryos up until it was technically
feasible. The first group appealed to the need to respect
human life from its very beginning and argued that life
starts in the moment of fertilisation (i.e. when sperm cells
fertilise oocytes) and must be protected. Interestingly, not
all the opponents of embryo research holding the view
that embryos are persons were arguing from a religious
standpoint [15]. Some of those arguing against embryo re-
search in principle referred to the potentiality of the em-
bryos to become fully developed persons and concluded
that human life, no matter at what stage of development,
should be granted full protection, and that embryos
should not be used for research [16–18]. The opposing
view, held by those in favour of legalising embryo re-
search, found support from those appealing to the poten-
tial benefits of such research, and from those who granted
inexistent or low moral status to the embryos. This group
also referred to the potentiality of embryos to become
fully developed persons, but concluded that potential per-
sons (i.e. embryos) were different from actual persons and
that this was a sufficient reason to allow research on hu-
man embryos [13]. Unsurprisingly, according to them, the
potential benefits of such research, for instance an in-
creased understanding of early human development, bet-
ter IVF procedures and treating infertility and pregnancy
losses outweighed the costs of embryo research [13].
There are some differences between the 1980s debate
on embryo research and today’s newly emerged debate.
Perhaps, the main difference is that, whereas previously
research beyond the 14-day mark was scientifically un-
tenable, it has recently become technically possible.
When the limit was decided upon, scientists were not
able to keep the embryos alive in vitro for longer than
the limit allowed. The experiments reported in the two
recent articles prove that scientists are now able to keep
embryos alive for up to 12-13 days and possibly longer.
In addition, IVF as an assisted reproductive technique
has significantly improved and many of the technical ad-
vances in this technique are owed to embryo research. It
is in this sense that, while the 1980s debate focused on
the question of whether embryo research should be
allowed, the current debate occurs against the backdrop
of the advances that allow embryo research to be made
possible. Moreover, while in the past it was not possible
to preserve the viability of the embryos employed for re-
search, today there are technical solutions that allow sci-
entists to obtain embryonic stem cells for research that
do not result in the destruction of the embryo (e.g. em-
bryo biopsy2). Lastly, whilst previous research was car-
ried out on early human embryos only, today, and
potentially increasingly in the future, embryo research
could be done on artificial entities that bear sufficient re-
semblance to embryos to be suitable for such research.
To name a few methods, these entities would be created
through, for instance, altered nuclear transfer (ANT) or
parthenogenesis of oocytes [6, 7, 19].3
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Conflicting moral views on embryo research
Today’s discourses on the moral status of human em-
bryos are not so different from the discourses that, in
the 1980s, resulted in the establishment of the IVF
Inquiry, a committee appointed to produce an advisory
report on the moral, legal and social issues raised by
IVF, embryo research and other practices. Oxbridge
philosopher Mary Warnock was appointed its chair. As I
show in the next sections, the procedural work of the
committee, the views of the chair, and the way the rec-
ommendations on how to proceed about embryo re-
search were drafted represent an important precedent
for the current debate on embryo research.
The members of the committee, including Warnock
herself, were aware of the conflicting moral views on
embryo research, and of the difficulty of reconciling
them and establishing which one should prevail [20–22].
In addition to this, they tried to review as many different
points of view as possible: the committee considered evi-
dence from experts working in the field of human
reproduction (around 300 individuals and organisations)
as well as from the public (695 letters and submissions).
Although the evidence collected in this way was never
published4 and although it was never made transparent
how this evidence influenced the final recommendations,
it is presumed that the committee considered all the
submitted evidence and took into account the different
views that it reflected [15].
Legitimating embryo research would have likely caused
uproar from those who accorded full moral status to hu-
man embryos. At the same time, an outright ban on em-
bryo research was perceived as problematic for two
reasons: due to a concern for the loss of potential bene-
fits of embryo research, and due to the perceived need
to allow IVF to go forward only if backed up by studies
on the development of early human embryos. A solution
to this impasse was to find a compromise between these
two positions: this is how the idea to introduce a cut-off
point until which research would be permissible came
about. Introducing a cut-off was a solution of comprom-
ise, as it would have enabled embryo research, but only
until a certain stage of development. Different possible
limits were examined, including the 5th day (i.e. begin-
ning of implantation in utero) and the 11th day (i.e. the
end of implantation) after fertilisation.
It was developmental biologist Anne McLaren, a member
of the committee, who proposed using a peculiar biological
event in the embryo development to mark the end of the
permitted period of research [11]. McLaren suggested limit-
ing research to the 14th day of development because this
moment signals the emergence of the primitive streak in
the human embryo, a precursor of the brain and the spinal
cord. At the same time, the emergence of this streak marks
the beginning of gastrulation, a process whereby the
embryonic inner cell mass starts to differentiate into three
layers (endoderm, mesoderm, and ectoderm). This process
also corresponds to the last point in which the embryo
could cleave into twins (i.e. twinning) or in which two em-
bryos could merge into one (e.g. tetragametic chimerism).
McLaren argued that: “If I had to point to a stage and say
‘This is when I began being me”, I would think it would
have to be here” [23]. In order to endorse the 14-day limit
and the decision to allow research up until this stage of em-
bryo development, the term ‘pre-embryo’ was coined. It
designated the embryo before the emergence of the primi-
tive streak, and it marked a distinction from the ‘unborn
child’ (i.e. the embryo after the 14-day) [12, 23]. It was
therefore a term with ethical and political significance, a
term that designated the boundary between acceptable and
non-acceptable research.
Eventually, in 1990, the recommendations of the IVF-
Inquiry comprised in the Warnock Report [21] were
enshrined into law, in what became the Human
Embryology Act [22].
How the 14-day limit came about: Compromise and its
critics
Introducing a cut-off date –in this case the 14-day limit –
represented an instance of favouring compromise between
competing moral views, beliefs and values over questions
of rightness and wrongness [10, 15, 24]. Questions regard-
ing whether or not the embryo has moral status, what
moral status stands for and entails, and questions regard-
ing the core features of personhood and the beginning of
human life were overridden by other considerations.
These considerations included the moment from
which the embryo should be granted legal protection,
what kind of society can be praised and in what kind
of society people can live with clear conscience [12,
14]. The decision to shift the focus from ontological
questions concerning rightness and wrongness to more
practical questions is linked to a conception of morality
whose role is to address moral matters arising in the
context of public policy. The IVF-Inquiry was not created
to produce perfect philosophical reasoning and give a
lesson in moral expertise, but rather to facilitate a process
whereby scientists’ work would become more “socially
palatable” and whereby workable regulations would be
delivered [12, 25].
The committee favoured a moral relativistic approach to
embryo research and to the conflicting positions present
in the debate. Instead of trying to establish which position
was the most accurate one and what view came closest to
an absolute moral truth, the committee worked under the
assumption that the views of those for and against embryo
research deserved to be equally respected and taken into
consideration. Thus, the view of those who believed that
the embryos are to be treated as if they were persons (and
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hence, they deserve full moral status) and research on
them should be banned, and the view of those who be-
lieved that embryos are not more than a cluster of cells
(no moral status at all) and research on them should go
forward were equally taken into account. In this sense, the
committee followed the assumption that the truth and
standing of moral judgments is not universal, but relative
to the social, political and cultural context in which these
moral judgements arise [26]. Warnock and her committee
experienced first-hand the diversity of views both in her
committee and in society at large. Their strategy was to
exercise tolerance in matters of morality and moral
disagreement, and to respect value pluralism [14, 27].
Warnock understood the role of her committee in these
terms: starting from the acknowledgement of the different
and competing moral positions, she tried to find the path
of greater social consensus among them [10]. In addition
to this, Warnock and her committee opted to take into ac-
count not only moral arguments based on scientific evi-
dence and philosophical reasoning, but also moral feelings
and beliefs [18]. In this sense, they followed Hume’s idea
that feelings, and not pure calculating rationality, need to
be considered in the assessment of ethical dilemmas and
that morality is ‘more properly felt than reasoned’ [28, 29].
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the existing disagreement
on the matter, the committee recommendation to allow
embryo research up until the 14th day was highly criticised.
Three committee members were outright against embryo
research and refused to endorse the final recommendations
concerning this matter [15, 21]. Members of the conserva-
tive party, of the pro-life group LIFE and Christian
scientists such as Ian Donald, publicly criticised the deci-
sion and lobbied against the report recommendation during
the parliamentary debate on the matter [12, 15]. Generally,
reactions from the more conservative side of the debate op-
posed this solution because it employed a sort of utilitarian
calculus (i.e. the potential benefits of embryo research) in-
stead of foregrounding considerations concerning how we
ought to treat unborn persons.
Interestingly, both those against and in favour of
conducting research on human embryos agreed on
some of the reasons why the 14-day limit was at least
problematic, if not completely wrong, namely arbi-
trariness and dodging the most fundamental question.
Those that criticised the decision on the grounds of
its arbitrariness argued that it was impossible to draw
a morally and legally significant distinction between
an embryo that was 13, 14 or 15 days old. However,
supporters and critics of embryo research drew differ-
ent conclusions from this impossibility to draw mor-
ally consistent lines: supporters argued that embryo
research should have been allowed until it was tech-
nically feasible (i.e. until when the scientists could
keep the embryo alive in vitro), while critics argued
that embryo research should have been banned
altogether. Another point of convergence between
supporters and critics was the fact that Warnock and
her committee did not address the questions of when
life begins and when an embryo becomes a person.
The decision to focus instead on the legal and moral
rights of the embryo, without addressing the issue of
what an embryo really is, was seen as extremely prob-
lematic by both sides. According to them, it was im-
possible to decide whether or not the human embryo
deserved protection without establishing why it/she/
he deserved protection, in other words whether or
not the embryo was a person [13, 18].
In addition to these critiques, philosopher John Harris
criticised Warnock and the committee for taking into ac-
count people’s feelings. Harris argued that not all feelings
were moral feelings and not all of them deserved respect.
According to him, moral feelings should be evaluated on
their capacity to make the world a better place, to save
lives and postpone deaths [13].
These reactions are important because they show that,
back then as today, there is indeed a fundamental moral
disagreement concerning early human life, how to treat
human embryos and about the legitimate role of feelings
and passions in public and regulatory discourses [30]. The
reactions that followed the committee’s recommendations
show the extent to which these views were in fact incom-
patible. However, it is important to note that those who
criticised the decision on the grounds of arbitrariness and
inconsistency in a certain sense missed the point of the
role and function of the committee. The committee was
put together in the first place in order to maintain public
trust and be a reliable means for external oversight of sci-
entific research. For this reason, the recommendations
were meant to be a solution of compromise rather than a
means to find the most consistent moral view.
In the next section, I briefly outline the reasons that ad-
vocates of embryo research currently put forward in
favour of extending the limit, and show how these same
reasons have played an important role in the debate on
whether to introduce two new techniques into the clinic.
The reasons in favour of extending the limit
Scientists (Robin Lovell-Badge and Azim Surani quoted in
[4]) and ethicists [3, 5] reacted to the results reported on
Nature and Nature Cell Biology by publicly calling for an
extension of the 14-day limit and for revising the current
regulation of embryo research. The argument that they
used strikes familiar chords: embryo research is beneficial
and now technically possible, therefore it should be
allowed. The two publications in Nature and Nature Cell
Biology [1, 2] partially changed the narrative of the debate
on embryo research: whereas in the 1980s it was a matter
of legalising such research, today the debate is about
Cavaliere BMC Medical Ethics  (2017) 18:38 Page 4 of 12
extending the 14-day limit for reasons grounded in benefi-
cence and technical feasibility, and thus merely adjusting
the regulatory framework of an already legalised practice.
These reasons draw upon consequentialist premises and
the principle of utility. They imply that being able to carry
out potentially beneficial research and not doing so would
be morally impermissible.5
According to the advocates of embryo research, the rea-
sons in favour of extending the 14-day limit are stronger
today than they were in the past. In 1984, these reasons
relied on positive provisions of the potential benefits (i.e.
the beneficence of research) and positive provisions of the
future feasibility (i.e. technical feasibility). In the past, it
was about faith in science and managing the uncertainties
of potential future benefits of embryo research with cer-
tain regulations. Today, Harris, Lovell-Badge and Surani
argued, it is about certainties concerning the benefits and
certainties of technical feasibility: embryo research has
proven to be both beneficial and feasible [4, 5].
The use of beneficence and feasibility in the debate on
technical innovations recalls another debate where simi-
lar arguments have been advanced in response to scien-
tific breakthroughs. Early in 2015, the United Kingdom
became the first country in the world to allow two novel
techniques that allow women with mitochondrial DNA
diseases to have genetically related children with a de-
creased risk of developing mitochondrial diseases. Muta-
tions in the mitochondrial DNA are the cause of many
diseases including, for instance, mitochondrial myop-
athy, Leigh disease and diabetes mellitus, and they are
normally inherited through the maternal line [31]. Up
until the approval of these two techniques, prospective
mothers needed to turn to oocytes donors, PGD or
adoption in order to have children free from these gen-
etically inherited mutations [32]. Although these tech-
niques (maternal spindle transfer, MST, and pronuclear
DNA transfer, PNT) have been depicted as involving the
‘replacement’ of the affected mitochondrial DNA of the
oocyte of the prospective mother or of the fertilised oo-
cyte with the mitochondrial DNA of a female donor, this
description is inaccurate. What really happens is that the
oocyte’s, or zygote’s, nucleus previously housed in a cell
with deleterious mitochondria is rehoused in an enucle-
ated cell with healthy mitochondria. The embryo that re-
sults from these techniques will have the genetic
makeup of the prospective father, the mitochondrial
DNA of a donor and the nuclear DNA of the prospect-
ive mother.
Despite the similarities between the arguments in
favour of the extension of the 14-day limit and the argu-
ments in favour of allowing mitochondrial replacement
techniques (MRTs), it is important to note that there are
differences between the current debate on extending the
limit for embryo research and the recent debate on
MRTs.6 These differences concern both the content of
these debates (i.e. the specific arguments in favour and
against and the object of the controversy) and their po-
tential outcomes (i.e. extending an existing limit for em-
bryo research instead of allowing two new techniques to
be introduced into the clinic). With respect to the con-
tent, the arguments against MRTs focused on concerns
regarding the implementation of newly developed tech-
niques and the risks that their implementation may pose
to future children. On the contrary, the arguments
against the extension of the 14-day limit focused on
basic research rather than clinical implementation. In
particular, they pertain to the ethics of using intrinsically
valuable beings such as human embryos for instrumental
purposes. In addition, these debates differ in terms of
what proponents and opponents wanted to achieve (i.e.
in terms of outcome). The potential outcome of the de-
bate on MRTs was to establish whether these new tech-
niques were sound from a technical and moral point of
view. On the contrary, the debate on embryo research is
about setting a new limit for continuing existing re-
search and for possibly gaining new insights into embryo
development. These are just a few of the differences be-
tween the two debates and a detailed analysis of such
differences is beyond the scope of this article. However,
it is important to note that despite these differences,
some similarities with respect to the argument in favour
of MRTs and embryo research can be drawn. In particu-
lar, those in favour of MRTs and of extending the 14-day
limit appealed to beneficence and technical feasibility ar-
guments in both instances.
One of the most contested issues concerning the eth-
ics of MRTs is whether these techniques would bring
about changes to the human germline (i.e. changes in
human oocytes, sperm cells or embryos that do not only
appear in the children resulting from the procedure, but
also in succeeding generations) [33]. Ethicists and scien-
tists are divided over whether MRTs amount to germline
modifications as changes introduced in the oocyte (in
the case of MST) or in the zygote (in the case of PNT)
concern the mitochondrial rather than the nuclear DNA
[34]. In addition, as mitochondrial DNA is inherited
from the maternal line, if only male embryos are trans-
ferred in utero, the modifications introduced with MRTs
will not be present in the succeeding generations7 [35].
An assessment of these arguments is beyond the scope
of this article,8 but what matters for the present analysis
is that up until the approval of these techniques, modifi-
cations of the genetic makeup of sperm cells, eggs and
embryos were only legally possible in-vitro and never for
clinical purposes in-vivo. Modification of the human
germline (i.e. gametes, and embryos) has traditionally
been considered a line that should not be crossed. This
line was recognised as morally relevant in 1978 with the
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publication of Splicing Life, a report of the US President’s
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
appointed to regulate gene therapies, the reasons given
were partly scientific (i.e. it was not technically feasible)
and partly moral (i.e. it was seen as immoral to intro-
duce changes that would have been inherited by future
generations) [36, 37]. Modifying the human germline is
seen as problematic because of the unforeseen effects on
future generations, the risk of engaging in a form of new
eugenics, the risk of sliding down a slippery slope to
human enhancement, and other similar arguments
[38–40]. These arguments were already put forward
at the very early developments of gene therapy and
rehearsed in recent debates on MRTs and gene edit-
ing [34]. However, both historically and more recently
they have not remained unchallenged. Questions re-
lated to eugenics, enhancement and unforeseen effects
on future generations have been widely discussed
during the months prior to the approval of MRTs and
they are still a matter of ethical inquiry, as shown by
the increasing number of articles and reviews that
address these issues [41–44]. In addition, the public
consultation (2012) and the extensive reviews of the
scientific methods of MRTs carried out by the HFEA
(respectively in 2016, 2014, 2013, 2011), the work of
the Nuffield Council9 [44] and the parliamentary
debate on these techniques have considered such
concerns. The 2015 approval of these techniques by
the UK Parliament could be seen as a first instance
of crossing an internationally recognised ethical and
legal limit due to reasons of beneficence (i.e. children
born with these techniques will be free from mito-
chondrial diseases), but also due to the technical
feasibility of germline modifications (prior to the par-
liamentary vote on MRTs, these techniques were not
considered safe enough to be introduced into the
clinic) [45]. It is in this sense that the sum of the ar-
guments in favour of extending the 14-day limit
echoes, albeit only partially, those in favour of allow-
ing MRTs. Mitochondrial replacement techniques
represent an interesting case study and set an import-
ant precedent for the ethical assessment of technical
innovation. In contrast with other instances of inter-
nationally recognised bans such as the ban on human
cloning, the approval of MRTs shows that long-
standing limits such as the ban on germline modifica-
tions can be redefined once scientific advances make
it possible. The argument of beneficence to allow
research on human embryos for longer than 14 days
is the same as the one made in the 1980s. What has
changed is that while before it was technically diffi-
cult to introduce changes in reproductive cells and
embryos that would be inherited by future generations,
and to keep the embryos alive in vitro for a longer time
span, now both actions are theoretically possible. The
question, therefore, is whether the potential benefits of
embryo research and the feasibility of keeping the em-
bryos alive for longer than ever before are sufficient rea-
sons to extend the limit.
There is more to beneficence and technical
feasibility than meets the eye
In this section, I will show that technical feasibility and
beneficence of research as reasons in favour of extending
the limit of embryo research are not as fundamental as
those who advocate this change in the law claim. Ac-
cordingly, I scrutinise the arguments in favour of the
extension of the 14-day limit, while I leave unchallenged
those presented by the advocates of a more restrictive
regulatory framework for embryo research. The rationale
behind this choice does not rest on my own view on
embryo research, as I do not necessarily share the beliefs
and values of those against this practice. However, it is
often argued by proponents of technological changes
that the burden of justifying one’s own claims rests
solely on those who take a precautionary approach to
technological progress [46–48]. Against this view, I
propose that both those in favour and against embryo
research ought to share the burden of justifying their
moral views.
Facts, values and rationality
Technical feasibility as a reason in favour of extending the
limit relies (i.e. practice x is now technically feasible, so
there are good reasons to change the rule) on the premise
“practice x is technically feasible” to infer the conclusion
“there are good reasons to change the rule”. However, ap-
pealing to the beneficence of research and to its technical
feasibility is more problematic than those in favour of ex-
tending the limit for embryo research suggest it is. This
line of arguing is problematic because it relies on what
eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume considered
an “inconceivable deduction” of what ought to be done
from a set of is-premises [28]. Hume believed that it was
logically fallacious to infer a normative judgment (ought-
conclusion) from a set of factual claims (is-premises).
Thus, following Hume, the normative conclusion “there
are good reasons to change the 14-day rule” cannot be
rightly inferred from the factual premise “embryos can
now survive in vitro for longer than before” (i.e. technical
feasibility of extending the time span for embryo re-
search). This critique of inferring normative conclusions
from factual claims is similar to the critique that
philosopher George Edward Moore moved to moral natu-
ralists (i.e. those who argue in favour of a link between
moral philosophy and the natural sciences). Moore argued
that anyone who infers that practice x is good from any
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preposition about the natural properties of x commits the
“naturalistic fallacy” [49]. According to Moore, this fallacy
shows how premises about some factual or natural fea-
tures of practices do not support normative conclusions
about these practices. Thus, anyone who supports an ex-
tension of the 14-day limit for embryo research on the
basis of the technical feasibility of this research would
commit the naturalistic fallacy. According to Moore, one
of the main problems of moral naturalists was that they
relied on purely factual premises concerning the natural
features of certain practices to infer normative conclusions
concerning these practices. To counter this tendency,
Moore suggested instead that normative conclusions
ought to be inferred from both factual and normative
premises.
The argument of the beneficence of research (i.e. em-
bryo research should be allowed for longer than 14 days
due to the benefits of such research) is also more prob-
lematic than those in favour of extending the limit suggest
it is. According to this argument, the 14-day limit should
be extended because of the potential benefits of such re-
search and because these benefits outweigh the costs of
embryo research [5, 13, 50, 51]. This appeal to beneficence
is common in bioethics and it is often used by those who
take a utilitarian stance on the ethical assessment of scien-
tific progress, technologies and practices [3, 46, 52–54].
Proponents of what I have called the argument of the ben-
eficence of research rely on historical evidence to support
their claim: they argue that since technological and
scientific progress in medicine proved to be beneficial to
humankind, it should be allowed to continue. Returning
to embryo research, those who appeal to the beneficence
of research to extend the 14-day limit ground their argu-
ment on the past benefits that embryo research brought
about, and on the potential benefits that the extension of
the limit could bring about [4, 5].
At first sight, it seems fairly obvious that if something
is beneficial, even only potentially beneficial, it should be
allowed. However, this approach is problematic for a
number of reasons and scholars have criticised bioethi-
cists, institutions and scientists for their often-hyped
claims concerning the benefits of new technical possibil-
ities [55–58]. Firstly, the argument of beneficence and
its proponents rely on an optimistic view of scientific
progress, research and technologies [55, 59, 60], a view
that echoes the post-illuminist positivistic ideas of sci-
ence and technology, and that often overemphasises the
potential benefits of scientific research [56, 58, 59] and
its understating as a progressive and linear endeavour
[61, 62]. Secondly, the argument is problematic because
it relies on a misleading estimation of costs and benefits.
The benefits taken into consideration for the cost-
benefit assessment are not the benefits of embryo re-
search for the embryos, as embryo research does not
benefit embryos. Instead, the benefits considered are
those to society, to existing and future individuals. On
the contrary, the costs taken into account for the cost-
benefit assessment are not those to society, but to the
embryos used for research. Those who emphasise bene-
fits of embryo research over its costs do not grant moral
status to the embryos, nor do they believe that embryos
are capable of experiencing pain (i.e. being harmed).
Hence, they do not really see any cost associated with
embryo research, and they thus conclude that benefits
outweigh these (inexistent) costs. The substantial dis-
agreement over the moral status of the embryos and the
criticism moved against research on human embryos
show that embryo research is a controversial and not-
settled issue [15, 63]. For this reason, the costs of ex-
tending the limit beyond the 14th day, and of embryo re-
search more generally, might be higher than proponents
of embryo research like to admit. Embryo research has a
societal cost of offending certain moral feelings on the
value of early human life, and not respecting certain
strongly held convictions on how we ought to treat hu-
man embryos. Thus, individuals who hold such views
may find themselves feeling alienated from or devalued
by society [17, 18, 64]. Possibly, proponents of embryo
research who argue from a utilitarian standpoint, and
who rely on the argument of the beneficence of such re-
search, are aware of the possibility of offending moral
feelings and strongly held beliefs, but they still consider
the benefits of embryo research greater than the costs of
offending the people who hold these feelings.
One of the reasons why many proponents of embryo re-
search do not grant moral worth to these feelings, and to
the opponents’ arguments, is that they consider their
views to be fundamentally flawed, irrational and not
grounded in scientific evidence. Most advocates of embryo
research thus dismiss the view that embryos are (future)
persons and that embryo research would violate these fu-
ture persons’ dignity on the grounds of the irrationality of
such ontological claims. For to them, these claims are
based on faith rather than reason and factual consider-
ations. However, it is important to note that those in
favour of embryo research who argue from supposedly ra-
tional positions do not live up to the very same standards
of rationality that they require of their opponents. In this
sense, dismissing questions related to human dignity and
the moral status of the embryos on the basis of their ir-
rationality and lack of scientific support, becomes prob-
lematic [65, 66]. Scientific evidence is often interpreted
according to one’s own pre-existing moral convictions, so-
called evidence-based claims are still influenced by these
moral convictions and by the way bioethicists react and
argue about new technical possibilities [56, 67, 68]. Thus,
irrational beliefs are not an exclusive ownership of those
arguing against embryo research: similar irrational beliefs
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play a role in assessments of embryo research put forward
by those in favour of embryo research on the grounds that
it can save future lives.10
Slippery slope
The slippery slope argument offers a last reason of cau-
tion against embryo research [69–71]. The slippery slope
argument entails that allowing practice x (in this in-
stance, allowing embryo research or extending the limit
for embryo research) would initiate a process leading to
unethical practices w, y, z. The slippery slope argument
against embryo research is approximately like this: em-
bryo research should not be allowed/the limit should
not be extended because allowing research on embryos
in a very early stage of their development/extending the
limit beyond day 14 will lead to the permissibility of re-
search on foetuses and new-borns. The argument voices
the concern that once we become accustomed to re-
search on pre-embryos, we will extend the permission
for research on embryos on a later stage of development;
once we become accustomed to this too, then we will
allow research on foetuses and babies. ‘Slippery slopers’
believe that morally problematic practices such as em-
bryo research should not be allowed, or the limit should
not be extended, because of the difficulties of drawing a
line between practices currently considered less morally
problematic, such as research on pre-embryos, and prac-
tices currently considered highly immoral, such as
research on foetuses at a late stage of their develop-
ment. These arguments are widely criticised in the
philosophical arena for their lack of empirical
evidence, and for not considering that government
regulations can be used to prevent such scenarios
from coming into being [72–74]. In spite of these
critiques, they are still used in debates on techno-
logical advances, scientific research and policy making
[68, 69, 71, 75]. The persistence of slippery slope ar-
guments in academic works and policy making seems
to suggest that attempts from philosophers to dis-
credit this argument have been unsuccessful. The
charge of starting a slippery slope towards inadmis-
sible practices is still a powerful one [63, 68]. An ana-
lysis of the theoretical fallacies and merits of this
argument is beyond the scope of the paper, as is a
final assessment of its validity. However, it is import-
ant to note that extending the limit beyond the 14th
day of development will provide support to those
who rely on the slippery slope argument to oppose
embryo research. This might have non-negligible so-
cial consequences. For example, extension of the limit
for embryo research would show that what is feared
by ‘slippery slopers’ (i.e. that once a practice becomes
legal it is difficult to prevent the permission of its fu-
ture developments) can eventually become a reality.
Even if the limit was extended only for a few days,
‘slippery slopers’ might take this extension as a sign
that their fears are well grounded, contrary to what
their critics argue.
Is compromise the best way forward?
Let me take stock of what I have said thus far. In the pre-
vious section, I have shown how the arguments of benefi-
cence and technical feasibility in favour of embryo
research and of extending the 14-day limit are less
straightforward than their proponents seem to suggest. I
have also suggested, using the slippery slope argument as
an example, that extending the limit for embryo research
might undermine public trust in scientists, regulators and
overseeing bodies. In order to show the importance of
compromise and the value of respecting pluralism in the
context of embryo research, I will not juxtapose the argu-
ments of the beneficence of research and of technical
feasibility with arguments pertaining to the sanctity of hu-
man life and human dignity. These arguments arise in the
context of fundamental disagreements concerning the be-
ginning of human life, the value of personhood, and con-
cerning what respect human dignity ought to entail. They
are portrayed as factual questions by both advocates and
critics of research (i.e. research beyond the 14-day should
not be allowed/should be allowed because human em-
bryos are/are not persons and doing research on them
would/would not violate their dignity); however, they are
not merely a matter of fact, but they are informed and
shaped by values, feelings and beliefs. Regardless of one’s
opinion regarding the values and beliefs of those defend-
ing the sanctity of life view, the burden of justifying one’s
claim should rests both on those defending this view and
on those advocating technological progress, contrary to
what seems to be normally believed [48].
What I intend to argue in this last section is that even
if the question of the moral status of the embryos cannot
be easily settled, there are two arguments in favour of
reaching a compromise and respecting value pluralism
in the context of embryo research: the argument of trust
and the argument of respect. I argue that the argument
of trust in favour of compromise, albeit being sound and
widely used, could, in certain instances, assume instru-
mental and paternalistic forms. I then argue that in the
context of embryo research and more generally in the
governance of scientific and technical breakthroughs it
would be helpful to employ what I call the argument of
respect.
The argument of trust and the argument of respect
The first argument in favour of reaching a compromise
that, other things being equal, respects value pluralism is
what I define as “the argument of trust”. It is structured
as follows:
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a) Scientific research is important because it improves
people’s lives and it should be allowed to carry on
b) Public trust is necessary to carry on scientific research
c) Therefore, public trust in scientific research ought
to be preserved
Given competing views concerning the moral status of
the embryo, this argument provides a reason in favour
of finding a solution of compromise that accommodates
as much as possible these views and avoids the risk of
overriding those of one camp with those of the other.
The argument of trust relies on premise a) to show that
people’s lives are improved by scientific research [76]. It
relies on premise b) to show that public trust is a neces-
sary condition for scientific research to be carried on
[77, 78]. Trust is needed to ensure public acceptance of
concrete applications of research; to preserve public
confidence in policies informed by scientific research;
and to allow the investment of public resources in scien-
tific research [77, 78]. In the context of embryo research,
the argument shows that, given the potential benefits of
embryo research (premise a), and given the importance
of public trust to carry on this type of research (premise
b); there are good reasons to preserve public trust (con-
clusion c). Following this argument, it is possible to draw
two conclusions: on the one hand, if the extension of the
14-day limit for embryo research is strongly opposed by
the public,11 then there are good reasons not to extend
the limit. On the other, if opposing views coexist in the
public understanding of embryo research, then there are
good reasons to find a solution that strikes a comprom-
ise between these views.
The 14-day limit was a solution of compromise between
conflicting moral views designed to maintain public trust
whilst allowing research to go forward [12, 24, 79]. Today,
there are two questions that need to be addressed, an em-
pirical and a normative-theoretical question. The empir-
ical question is whether the public (or at least a vast
majority of it) is against the extension of the 14-day limit
for embryo research. The normative-theoretical question
is whether public opinion should influence the decision to
change or retain the current 14-day rule, and if so, to what
extent. An implication of taking into account the empir-
ical question is that, if the public view of embryo research
has become more favourable, then there is at least one
good reason in favour of revisiting the 14-day rule.12 In
January 2017, a YouGov poll commissioned by the BBC in
the United Kingdom, asked respondents’ views on an ex-
tension of the limit up to the 28th day. Interestingly, 48%
of the 1740 respondents said that they would be in favour
of extending the limit, while 19% wanted to keep the
current limit. In addition to these respondents, 10% main-
tained that they would want embryo research to be
banned altogether, while 23% did not express any of the
aforementioned preferences [80]. In addition to the empir-
ical question regarding public attitudes towards the exten-
sion of the 14-day limit, one may wonder how such
attitudes would be towards therapies and scientific results
obtained thanks to research on embryos beyond this limit
in countries that may extend it. Currently, the 14-day limit
is either enshrined in the laws (for instance in the United
Kingdom, Canada and Spain) or specified in the scientific
guidelines (for instance in Singapore, China and in the
United States) of many countries. However, these regula-
tory frameworks may change in the future. Hence, if this
becomes the case, it would be interesting to investigate
public attitudes towards those therapies and other ad-
vances of basic research that are made possible by re-
search in countries that allow embryo research beyond
day 14.13
I will not provide an answer to these empirical
questions here, if only because of the dearth of em-
pirical data on public attitudes towards the extension
of the limit, and embryo research more generally. Re-
garding, instead, the normative-theoretical question
(i.e. whether public opinion should influence the deci-
sion to change or retain the current 14-day rule) the
argument of trust would indicate that the answer is
yes: public opposition to extending the 14-day rule
should prevent its extension, while public agreement
to a proposed change (i.e. the 28-day limit or other
future proposals) should facilitate its extension. The
risk of proceeding regardless of public attitudes to-
wards an extension of the limit is that policies de-
rived by embryo research will not be backed up by
public consensus and applications of embryo research
(e.g. therapies developed thanks to the knowledge
yield by embryo research) not accepted. If the import-
ance of maintaining public trust in scientific research
(premise b) is motivated by these considerations, then
it seems that public trust is only valued for instru-
mental and extrinsic reasons. In other words, this un-
derstanding of the importance of maintaining public
trust in scientific research does not value public trust
for its own sake, but only for its role in allowing re-
search to go forward. What is problematic of this ap-
proach to public trust is that it offers a
consequentialist reason in favour of respecting value
pluralism, a reason that pertains to the better tangible
outcomes of respecting value pluralism over other
strategies of governance. In addition to this, when the
instrumental justification of maintaining public trust
is associated with a representation of the public as ill-
informed and with little or no understanding of the
potential benefits of research, it could be motivated
by paternalistic considerations. Scientists and ethicists
may risk misinterpreting public concerns and views
over embryo research as the result of a lack of
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expertise or evidence-based information rather than a
matter of legitimate and genuine disagreement over
values [81, 82].
The second premise of the argument of trust, how-
ever, could be also motivated by a concern for a de-
liberative conception of democracy. This conception
of democratic governance requires to both citizens
and their representatives to provide public justifica-
tions of their views and to engage in deliberative pro-
cesses. Public trust becomes then fundamental to
allow these deliberative processes to take place and to
foster better strategies for policy-making [82, 83].
These deliberative processes of mutual exchange be-
tween experts and the public, together with a com-
mitment to respecting conflicting moral views (i.e.
respect for value pluralism) provide a reason in
favour of finding a solution of compromise that, given
competing views concerning the moral status of the
embryo, respect this plurality of views and values re-
garding embryo research. These considerations con-
cerning the importance of maintaining public trust
echo other considerations employed to defend democ-
racy as a political system and as a valuable form of
governance. These include, for instance, equality:
given the existence of conflicting views, values and
beliefs, a good reason to respect them is that people
or groups holding these different views will be
respected by being granted an equal say on matters
of common concern [84, 85]. Mertens and Pennings
[8] have argued in favour of the benefit of comprom-
ise in the context of different policies regulating em-
bryonic stem cell research and have concluded that
there is a moral obligation to respect conflicting
moral views [8]. Similarly, Devolder argued that in
spite of the epistemic costs of compromise, middle-
ground positions could still be defended in the con-
text of policy-making [6]. What I suggest here is that
the commitment to a democratic decision-making
process entails a fundamental respect for value plural-
ism [86]. In Warnock’s and the IVF-Inquiry’s time,
this respect for value pluralism translated into a de-
liberation resulting in the 14-day rule. Today it trans-
lates into favouring an assessment of the rule and of
the potential reasons to change it that once again
takes into account the conflicting moral views held in
society; an assessment that cannot rest on the argu-
ment of the benefice of research and of scientific
feasibility alone.
Conclusions
In this article, I have argued that the 14-day limit for
embryo research is not valuable in spite of being a so-
lution of compromise, but rather because of it. The
idea of a democratic society is that even those who
do not accord intrinsic value to the human embryo
should respect value pluralism and accord moral
worth to opposing views. For this reason, any pro-
posal to change the 14-day rule needs careful evalu-
ation of the scientific feasibility and effective benefits
of embryo research; it needs an extensive inquiry into
public attitudes concerning embryos; and it needs a
deliberative process that takes these elements into ac-
count. It does not need positions that consider only
the beneficence of research and its technical feasibil-
ity. This would be undemocratic and potentially a
move not backed up by a rigorous assessment of the
science behind embryo research. Warnock and the
other members of the IVF-Inquiry, albeit possibly
guided by utilitarian-inspired views, opted for valuing
a solution of compromise over other solutions [87,
88] They did so behind closed doors. In this sense,
the recent experiments published in Nature and Na-
ture Cell Biology and the newly sparked debate on
embryo research represent a valuable opportunity to
begin a truly deliberative and democratic debate on
this issue [82, 86]. All in all, greater technical poten-
tial translates into greater responsibilities and need
for deliberation.
Endnotes
1These embryos are not implanted in utero but frozen
for further implantation. When a successful pregnancy is
established, it had to be decided what do with these
supernumerary frozen embryos.
2For a detailed analysis of this alternative and of its
limits, see the work of Katrien Devolder [6].
3It must be noted that these two alternatives have been
criticised for a number of reasons. For instance, it is un-
clear whether parthenotes are significantly different from
human embryos and whether ANT really escapes the
ethical challenges of embryo research and whether it is a
scientifically realistic alternative [6].
4The submissions from the experts can be found at
the House of Commons Library, but they have never
been published.
5I commented elsewhere that this line of argument is
problematic [61].
6I am grateful to one of the reviewers for raising this
point.
7In the United Kingdom, the law regulating MRTs al-
lows both female and male embryos to be transferred in
utero. This is different from the American approach to
the clinical implementation of these novel techniques:
the National Academies for Science, Engineering and
Medicine (NASEM) Report recommended that only
male embryos should be implanted in utero [35, 89].
8For insightful analyses of the MRTs debate and of the
ethics of these techniques, see [41–43, 90, 91].
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9The Nuffield Council on Bioethics is an UK-based in-
dependent institution that examines ethical issues arising
in the field of biotechnology and biomedicine.
10For a detailed discussion of such position in another
context (i.e. the debate on human enhancement), see [48].
11It must be noted that the idea that ‘the public’ is against
scientific developments and breakthroughs is criticised for
being artificially constructed (see for instance [58]).
12Other good reasons include technical feasibility,
public utility and so forth.
13A case in point is Germany, which allows research on
embryonic stem cells that are produced abroad (i.e. in
countries with less restrictive legislations) before January
2002 (when the German Stem Cell Law was issued), but
does not allow to derivation of stem cells from super-
numerary embryos [6].
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